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IS IT FRAUDULENT PER SE AS TO CREDITORS FOR A VENDOR
OF PERSONAL PROPERTY TO IMMEDIATELY CONSTITUTE THE VEN-
DEE HIS BAILER? The much mooted question in Pennsylvania
whether a vendee of goods sold upon credit can redeliver the
goods to the vendor, and then immediately accept them on con-
signment or bailment lease, in order to protect the vendor, has
arisen squarely for decision, apparently for the first time, in the
recent case of Gattie v. Kremp, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 514. The'facts
there involved were these: A jeweler of Reading, Pa., indebted to
a New York creditor, whose claim was being pressed, met him by
appointment at an hotel in Reading. At this meeting the claim
was adjusted by the return of a portion of the goods originally
bought from the creditor, and the delivery of certain other goods
belonging to the debtor. These goods were actually delivered to
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the creditor, and the indebtedness of the latter cancelled. At the
same time and place, and almost immediately after the adjustment
of the account, the creditor delivered the goods so received to the
debtor, to be by him sold as a consignment account for the cred-
itor. The goods were placed on sale in the debtor's store, with
no special mark of identification. Subsequently, another creditor
of the debtor obtained judgment on a debt which accrued prior to
this transaction, issued execution and levied upon the goods in the
debtor's store, including the goods held on consignment.
At the trial of an issue arising under a sheriff's interpleader, the
trial judge refused binding instructions to the jury to find for the
execution creditor, and charged that "the law cannot undertake to
fix any particular time during which a man must have held actual
possession of goods in order to constitute a transfer which will be
valid, but it requires that the transfer shall have been an actual one,
with the right in the transferee of continued possession. If there
was a transfer, a legal, valid transfer at the time, then the next
question arises, what was the nature of the retransfer of these goods
to Burkhart. It is for you to say whether this retransfer was a
bonafide transfer to him for inspection of the goods, or on consign-
ment to be sold by him on Gattle Brothers' account, as the
property of Gattle Brothers . . . If it was a bona fide and honest
consignment, the goods to be sold as the property of Gattle
Brothers, then they remained the property of Gattle Brothers, and
this execution could not be lawfully levied upon this property."
The jury rendered a verdict for the owner of the consigned goods.
The ruling of the trial judge was affirmed by the Superior Court.
With all due respect, it is submitted that the decision is unsound.
From the charge of the trial court, and the reasoning of the Superior
Court, it is manifest that the real point of the case was overlooked.
Was not the real question involved whether an assignment of
personal property is valid against the creditors of the former
owner without delivery to, accompanied and followed by continu-
ing possession in the assignee? It should be observed that the
property assigned was the absolute property of the assignor, and,
instead of it continuing in the possession of the assignee, it was
immediately redelivered into the absolute custody of the assignor.
There was no absolute, manifest and continuous change of pos-
session.
It is as well settled in Pennsylvania as any proposition can be,
that where the possession of personal property does not follow as
well as accompany its transfer, it is a fraud in law without regard
to the intention of the parties, and becomes a question for the
court and not for the jury: CIow v. IWoods, 5 S. & R. 275 (1819);
Stephens v. Gifforl, 137 Pa. 219 (1890).
In Yztng v. M' Chm-e, 2 W. & S. 147 (1841), A sold and deliv-
ered to B a yoke of oxen upon credit. About an hour afterwards
B redelivered the oxen to A, to be used by him until B found a
purchaser. About ten days after this transaction they were seized
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in execution by a creditor of A. Held, that the leaving of the
oxen in A's possession was a fraud per se on A's creditors.
In .f'Brite v. ill' Cl/clant, 6 W. & S. 94 (1843), A, being the
tenant of B, sold him certain property in payment of his rent.
The property was removed to a neighboring house by B for safe
keeping. In the course of the same day, and a few days follow-
ing, all of the property got back again in the possession of A.
Held, fraudulent per se.
In Meler v. Afeeder, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 488 (1896), a mother
sold certain personal chattels under a bill of sale to her son, resi-
dent at a distance. The property was in her possession, on her
farm and in her own building. No transfer of possession took
place. The son immediately leased the property to his mother,
and her apparent possession was uninterrupted. The son never
exercised any act of ownership excepting the execution of the
papers. Held, that the transaction was fraudulentpe1r se as to the
creditors of the mother.
How can these cases be distinguished in their facts from the.
case of Gatlie v. X_-enop ' The mere form of removing the goods
to the hotel and exhibiting them to the transferee cannot distin-
guish it from Weller v. Afeeder, stup;a. It is no answer to say
that an absolute transfer would have defeated the purpose and in-
tention of the parties. Surely, there is more reason to sustain the
action of a son in leaving property with his mother, than a cred-
itor who accepts property in payment of his debt and leaves it
with his debtor. If the act of the son is fraudulent, much more
so should be the act of a creditor. Where the property is capable
of an absolute transfer, the mere convenience of the parties will not
support it: Cloul v. Wfoods, sup ra. The parties complied strictly
with the law in delivering the property in the first instance to the
transferee, and thereby showed that an absolute transfer was both
practicable and feasible. There was no practical reason why the
possession should not have continued in the transferee. In such a
case the transferrer cannot immediately become the bailee of the
transferee. "The property," says, Mr. Bigelow "should not at
once go back into the possession of the seller ; . . . the seller
cannot be made immediately the bailee of the buyer without sub-
jecting the transaction to be treated . . . as in fraud of
creditors:" Bigelow on Fraud, Vol. II, p. 353-
The learned trial judge, however, charged "that the law cannot
undertake to fix any particular time during which a man must have
held actual possession of goods in order to constitute a transfer
which will be valid, but it requires that the transfer shall have been
an actual one, withi tie r4-zht in the transferee of confinualossession."
If the want of sufficient possession be a question for the court,
how can it be said that the law does not undertake to fix any
particular time during which a man must have actual possession.
Where the possession has been temporary, the courts have not
hesitated to declare the transfer fraudulent: 1iller v. Garman, 69
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Pa. 134 (1871); Garman v. Cooper, 72 Pa. 32 (1875); Cahdwell
v. -Fisher, 2 W. N. C. 383 (1875).
It may be that where the exclusive possession has continued in
the transferee for a considerable period, the question of good faith
should be submitted to the jury. This, however, does not disprove
that the court may, in a given instance, declare that the attempted
transfer is fraudulent per se.
Again, is it correct to say that the transferee should have the
right of continued possession ? The iaw is clear that the transferee
should have the actnal continued p5ossession, and not merely the rz-ght
of continue.d possession.
It cannot be seriously contended that Gattle v. Xrenl can be
supported as within the meaning of the apparent exception to the
rule, where, from the character and situation of the property, the
use being made of it, it is impracticable to insist upon an absolute
transfer.
There must, however, be the best delivery that the property is
reasonably capable of. The transferee must make a bona fide
attempt to inform the public of the transfer. The sale of mere
merchandise has never been thought to be within this exception:
Prichett v. Jones, 4 Rawle, 259 (833); C.,inninghant v. Neville,
io S. & R. 201 (1823); Echfeldt v. 4rick,  Phila. x6 (i86o).
No one will question that a bailment of personal property is valid
in Pennsylvania: Rowe v. Shar , 51 Pa. 26 (1865); .Riecker v.
Koechling, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 286 (1897).
Had the bailee in Gattle v. Krenp been in no way connected
with the ownership of the goods prior to their consignment to him,
it is obvious that the consignment would have been valid. It is
immaterial, therefore, whether the goods were delivered bona fide
by the debtor to his creditor in discharge of his debt ; but the real
question was, can the debtor be the bailee of the creditor after such
attempted transfer.
The Superior Court, in its opinion, says: "If the right to a
continuous possession, with an absolute title, became fixed in
Gattle Brothers, this creditor was not injured by their consignment
of these goods. His debt had been long overdue, and no false or
delusive credit was created. . . . There is no evidence in the case
intimating that Kremp knew, or did not know, that his debtor kept
or sold goods on consignment. The aim and trend of all the
decisions has been to prevent fraudulent impositions on creditors
by a misleading possession, but the open, notorious and exclusive
possession urged by the appellant would be destructive of all sales
under consignment."
This excerpt from the opinion certainly contains some remarkable
propositions of law.
.If the title of Gattle Brothers was absolute and valid, of course, no
one could complain. That, however, was the point in dispute.
If Clow v. Woods is still the law, it is difficult to perceive how
Gattle Brothers acquired an absolute and valid title to the goods.
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This is the first time, it is believed, that any one has seriously
ventured to intimate that a creditor is obliged to show that he was
misled hy the appearance of ownership through want of possession.
"The creditor's claim rests," says Mr. Bigelow, "upon the
debtor's possession. It does not rest upon the creditor's knowl-
edge of that possession; it is not necessary for the creditor to
show that he has been deceived by appearances. . . . It is not
necessary even that the creditor should have known of the exist-
ence of the property before the levy; enough, . . that the
debtor was found in possession:" Bigelow on Fraud, Vol. II, p.
327 ; see, also, Afar/in v. Jfa/hiot, 14 S. & R. 214 (1825).
Consignment accounts are perfectly legal in Pennsylvania; and,
in view of this, it is difficult to appreciate the force of the' sugges-
tion that any other conclusion in Gaftle v. Kren~p would have been
destructive of consignment accounts.
Even though a creditor's claim arises prior to the acquisition by
the debtor of the property in question, yet, if it be unpaid at the
time of the attempted transfer of the property to another, he has a-
right to question the validity of the transfer. The fact of being
an existing creditor is the basis of his right to attack the transfer
for want of change of possession: Buckley v. Duff, x9 W. N. C.
166, 168 (1886).
While it may be impossible to reconcile all the apparently dis-
cordant decisions on this much vexed question, it is confidently
believed nevertheless that the decision in Gatle v. f'-emp is a
wider departure from the true doctrine of Clow v. Wooads than any
case to be found in the books. The decision is especially unfortu-
nate in a state where the means of preferring creditors are already
too much favored to be consistent with a sound commercial
morality. Joseph H. Tatt/ane.
Philadelphia.
DIVORCE; MARRIA(E; CONFLICT OF LAWv; STULL'S ESTATE,
183 Pa. 625 (Jan. 3, 1898)- The facts were that the decedent
had married B, who still survived. In February, 1894, the wife
obtained a decree of absolute divorce from him on the ground of
adultery with one C. In April, 1894, A and C, both citizens of
Pennsylvania, went to Maryland and were there united in marriage.
They at once returned to Pennsylvania and lived together as man
and wife until his death in June, 1895. It was conceded that the
decedent and C his paramour went into Maryland to be there mar-
ried, for the express purpose of evading the law of Pennsylvania,
which, after a decree of divorce on ground of adultery, prohibits
marriage with the paramour during the life of the innocent party.
It was also conceded that by the law of Maryland there is no
such restriction. The question to be decided was whether the
Maryland marriage was valid. The court, after a very thorough
and interesting veview of the cases bearing on this subject, decided
that the marriage performed in Maryland was invalid. This de-
cision seems to be a very proper one and is in accord with good
